Case F, G and H (Return Home Under Supervision Order) [2026] EWCA Civ 713

The Court of Appeal considered whether a trial judge had erred in refusing care and placement orders and instead directing that three children be rehabilitated to their mother's care under supervision. The proceedings concerned three sisters: F, aged 14; G, aged 4; and H, aged 3.

The family had a longstanding history of domestic abuse perpetrated by the father against the mother. The mother repeatedly made allegations of abuse before later withdrawing them. Local authority involvement began in 2022 following concerns regarding domestic abuse and the mother's deteriorating mental health. In 2024, the children were accommodated under s.20 CA 1989 after the mother experienced psychotic episodes.

Following the family's move to a different area, concerns resurfaced. In February 2025 the mother was detained under s.2 Mental Health Act 1983, where she was diagnosed with acute psychosis attributed to the domestic abuse. The children were initially cared for by relatives before entering foster care, and care proceedings were issued in April 2025.

During proceedings, a parenting assessment concluded that the mother required domestic abuse intervention before rehabilitation could be considered safely, a psychiatrist gave a positive prognosis provided the mother remained compliant with medication and treatment, the parents separated; and the mother completed the Freedom Programme and demonstrated significant improvement, which was acknowledged by both the LA and the CG.

First Instance Decision

The LA sought final care orders for all three children. This was a long-term foster placement for F, and placement orders for G and H with a paternal aunt in Canada. The CG supported care orders, however; proposed an alternative outcome. In her view, there should be a clear pathway for F's return home within three months and that adoption for G and H was premature given the uncertainties surrounding the proposed placement in Canada. The trial judge rejected the LA’s care plans.

Having analysed the risks arising from domestic abuse alongside the mother's improved mental health, engagement with treatment, separation from the father, family support, and completion of domestic abuse work, the judge concluded that the children should return to their mother's care. He considered that with appropriate safeguards she was capable of providing "good enough" parenting and that the proposed placement in Canada carried its own uncertainties and risks. The judge made supervision orders, approved a phased return home under s.20 CA 1989, and made a two-year NMO against the father.

The Appeal         

The local authority appealed on ten grounds, which were ultimately distilled into two principal issues:

1. Whether the judge had acted outside his powers by making a two-year supervision order; and

2. Whether the judgment inadequately analysed the evidence, welfare balancing exercise, and applicable legal principles.

The LA argued that the judge failed to undertake a sufficiently structured analysis of domestic abuse in accordance with PD12J, inadequately assessed future risk, failed to explain why he departed from professional recommendations, misused the supervision order as a protective mechanism, and failed to conduct a proper welfare evaluation.

Decision

The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal. Although Baker LJ accepted that the judgment was written in an unconventional style, he rejected the criticism that it was legally inadequate. Relying on Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 and Re B (A Child) (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] EWCA Civ 407, he stated that judgments need only explain sufficiently why the judge reached their conclusions and are not required to summarise each piece of evidence. The trial judge's structured consideration of the mother's mental health, domestic abuse, welfare issues and competing care options demonstrated careful reasoning that fully satisfied the requirements for an adequate judgment.

Reading the judgment as a whole, Baker LJ found that the judge had fully appreciated all issues in the case. The judge had been entitled to conclude that the risks had reduced sufficiently to justify rehabilitation, particularly when balanced against the significant risks and uncertainty associated with the proposed overseas adoptive placement. The court reiterated the well-established principle that Court of Appeal should be slow to interfere with a trial judge's evaluation of evidence and assessment of future welfare.

The Supervision Order 

The Court accepted that the judge had made an error of law in directing that the supervision orders should last for two years. Under paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 3 CA 1989, a supervision order may only initially last for one year, although it may subsequently be extended upon application for a maximum overall period of three years.

The Court held that this mistake did not undermine the judge's welfare analysis. The appropriate course was simply for the judge to amend the order to reflect the one-year limit. If continued supervision proved necessary, the local authority could later apply for an extension under Schedule 3 para. 6(3).

Conclusion

This decision provides useful guidance on two important issues in public law children proceedings. First, it reinforces the Court of Appeal's reluctance to interfere with a trial judge's welfare assessment where the judgment demonstrates a careful evaluation of the evidence, even if its style departs from conventional drafting. Secondly, it serves as a reminder that supervision orders are subject to the statutory time limit in Schedule 3 CA 1989. While such procedural errors should be corrected, they will not automatically undermine the underlying welfare analysis where the judge's reasoning remains legally sound.

The full judgement can be found here.